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Abstract
Beck,  Demsrguc-Kunt,  and Levine study the impact of  concentrated  banking systems,  (2) in countries with
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they  find that crises are less likely (1) in  more  support private  property rights.
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assistance.I.  Introduction
The consolidation of financial intermediaries  around the globe is fueling an active public
policy debate on the impact of bank consolidation on financial stability.'  Unfortunately,
economic theory provides  conflicting predictions  about the relationship between banking
structure and bank fragility.  This paper investigates empirically the impact of banking structure
on financial  stability.
Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less concentrated
banking sector with many small banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated
banking sector with a few large banks as discussed in Allen and Gale (2000, 2003).  First,
proponents of the "concentration-stability"  view hold that large banks can diversify better so that
banking systems characterized by a few large banks will be less fragile than banking systems
with many small banks.2 Second, concentrated banking systems may enhance profits and
therefore lower bank fragility.  High profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks and
increase the franchise value of the bank, reducing incentives for bank owners to take excessive
risk (Hellmann, Murdoch,  and  Stiglitz, 2000).  Third, some hold that a few large banks are easier
to monitor than many small banks, so that corporate control of banks will be more effective and
the risks of contagion  less pronounced in a concentrated banking system (Allen and Gale, 2000).
The U.S., with its large number of small banks, supports this "concentration-stability"  view since
it has had a history of much greater financial instability than the U.K or Canada, where the
banking sector is dominated by a few large banks.
' See Group of Ten (2001), Bank for International  Settlements (2001), International  Monetary Fund (2001), and
Boyd and Graham  (1998,  1991).
2Models by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984),  Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986),
Allen (1990), and others predict economies of scale in intermediation.
2An opposing view is that a more concentrated  banking structure enhances bank fragility.
First, advocates of the "concentration-fragility"  view note that large banks frequently receive
greater net subsidies than small banks through implicit "too big to fail" policies. 3 This greater
subsidy for large banks may in turn intensify risk-taking incentives,  increasing the fragility of
concentrated banking systems (Boyd and Runkle,  1993 and Mishkin,  1999).4  Second,
proponents of the concentration-fragility  view would disagree with the proposition that a few
large banks  are easier to monitor than many small banks.  If size is positively correlated with
complexity, then large banks may be more opaque than small banks, which would tend to
produce a positive relationship between concentration  and fragility.  Finally, Boyd and De
Nicolo (2003) stress that banks with greater market power tend to charge higher interest rates to
firms, which induces firms to assume greater risk.  To the extent that the concentration  is
positively associated with banks enjoying greater market power,  the Boyd and De Nicolo (2003)
model predicts a positive relationship between concentration  and bank fragility.
Despite the importance of the topic for policymakers  and the different theoretical
predictions regarding the impact of banking structure on stability, cross-country  empirical
analysis of the relationship between bank structure and fragility is surprisingly limited.  For the
United States, Boyd and Runkle (1993) examine  122 bank holding companies.  They find that
there is an inverse relationship  between size and the volatility of asset returns, but no evidence
that large banks are less likely to fail.  In fact they observe that large banks failed somewhat
3  Even in the absence of deposit insurance,  banks are prone to excessive risk-taking due to limited liability for their
equity holders and to their high leverage (Stiglitz,  1972).
4  There is a substantial  literature that deals  with deposit insurance and its effect on bank decisions.  According  to this
literature -that includes  Merton (1977), Sharpe (1978), Flannery (1989), Kane  (1989), and Chan, Greenbaum and
Thakor (1992)  - mispriced deposit insurance produces an incentive for insured banks to take risk.  If the regulatory
treatment were the same for insured banks of all sizes, these models would predict no relationship  between bank size
and riskiness.  Since regulators fear potential macroeconomic  consequences  of large bank failures, most countries
have implicit "too  large to fail" policies which protect all liabilities of very large banks whether they are insured or
3more often in the 1971-90 period.  They explain this result by showing that larger banks are more
leveraged and less profitable in terms of asset returns.
Although there is a growing cross-country empirical literature on banking crises, this
literature does not address the issue of banking structure.  Earlier work has mostly focused on
identifying  (i) the macroeconomic  determinants of banking crises  (Caprio and Klingebiel,  1996;
Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache,  1998),  (ii) the relationship  between banking and currency
crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart,  1999), (iii) the impact of  financial liberalization on bank stability
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache,  1999), and (iv) the impact of deposit insurance design on bank
fragility (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2003).
This paper studies the impact of bank concentration,  bank regulations, and national
institutions  on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis using data on 79 countries
over the period 1980-1997  while controlling  for many national characteristics.  We believe this is
the first paper to examine the impact of concentration  on crises across a broad cross-section of
countries while controlling for differences in regulatory policies, national institutions governing
property rights and economic freedom, the ownership structure of banks, and macroeconomic
and financial conditions.  To draw accurate inferences about the independent impact of banking
structure on crises, it is imperative to control for international differences in the generosity of
deposit insurance regimes, capital-regulations, restrictions on bank entry, and regulatory
restrictions on bank activities.  Furthermore,  to assess the impact of concentration  on crises, we
need to control for cross-country  differences in bank ownership, i.e., the degree to which the
state and foreigners own the country's banks.  Finally,  we control for the overall institutional
not.  Thus, largest banks generally receive a greater net subsidy from the government unless they are less risky.  This
subsidy may in turn increase  the risk-taking incentives of the larger banks.
4environment governing economic activity as well as the level of economic development,
economic growth, inflation, terms of trade and exchange  rate changes,  credit growth, etc.
The paper finds that crises  are less likely in more concentrated banking systems.
Furthermore, the data indicate that fewer regulatory restrictions on banks - lower barriers to
bank entry and fewer restrictions on bank activities - reduce bank fragility.  We also find that
economic freedoms and better institutions in general promote bank stability.  Thus, concentration
and competition reduce bank fragility.  To the extent that our regulatory  and institutional
indicators fully capture the competitive  environment, these results suggest that concentration
proxies for something beyond market power.  We test whether concentration proxies for better
diversification  or easier monitoring.  We find no evidence supporting the claim that concentrated
banking systems are easier to monitor and weak evidence that concentrated banking systems  are
better diversified.  Our results do not seem to be driven by reverse causality and are robust to an
array of sensitivity checks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data set and
presents summary statistics.  Section III explains the methodology used in empirical tests.
Section IV contains the main results and Section V concludes.
I1.  Data anmd  Summary Statistis
This section describes  the variables  and the data sources we use in our empirical analysis.
Two variables of particular interest in our study are the crisis variable and the concentration
measure.  Table  1 presents these for the countries in our sample.  Table 2 contains  summary
statistics and correlations  of all variables we use in our analysis.  The Appendix reports detailed
variable definitions  and data sources.
5Crisis  is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is going through a
crisis, and zero if it is'not. We define a crisis only as a systemic crisis episode in which
significant segments of the banking sector become insolvent or illiquid, and cannot continue to
operate without special assistance from the monetary or supervisory authorities.  Following
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2003), we identify and date episodes of banking sector distress
using primarily information from Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel
(1999).  Then, these episodes of distress are classified as systemic if emergency measures were
taken to assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to
depositors or other bank creditors),  or if large-scale  nationalizations took place.  Episodes were
also classified as systemic if non-performing assets reached at least  10 percent of total assets at
the peak, of the crisis, or if the cost of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP.
Multiple crises are allowed, but the years in which banking crises were under way were excluded
from the panel since during a crisis the behavior of some of the explanatory variables is likely to
be affected by the crisis itself, leading to reverse causality.  For the period 1980-1997,  the sample
includes all countries covered in the International  Financial Statistics, excluding only countries
in transition and those for which data series was mostly incomplete.  This results in 79 countries
and 50 crisis episodes.
Concentration  equals the share of assets of the three largest banks.  We compute a
measure of bank concentration using the Bankscope database compiled by Fitch-IBCA, which
reports bank balance sheet data in a large cross-section of countries beginning in 1988.
However,  because the sample of banks covered increased significantly over the sample period,
changes in the measure of concentration may just reflect changes in coverage.  To reduce this
potential problem,  we average the measure over the period 1988-1997.  As reported in Tables  1
6and 2, most countries have concentrated banking systems with a sample mean of 72 percent.
Still, there is wide variation in the sample, with concentration  levels ranging from less than 20
percent for the U.S. to 100 percent for many African countries.  Simple correlations  do not show
a significant relationship between the crisis dummy and bank concentration,  although the sign is
negative.
Using this measure of concentration may blur the interpretation of estimation results
since for many observations the crisis date would precede the time period for which we have the
concentration values.  However,  later in our analysis we also use initial level of concentration
and focus on crises that occurred after this date.  Although this halves the number of
observations and reduces crisis episodes to 20, we confirm our results using this smaller sample.
As an additional robustness test, we test the sensitivity of the results to using a concentration
measure obtained from Barth, Caprio, and Levine's (2001, 2003) survey and analysis of national
regulatory policies.
To estimate the regressions,  we adopt the specification in Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (2003). Thus, the control variables are the rate of growth of real GDP, the change in
the external terms of trade, and the rate of inflation, to capture macroeconomic  developments
that are likely to affect the quality of bank assets.  Short-term real interest rate is included to
capture the banks'  cost of funds and since  increases in interest rates may also affect profitability
through increasing default rates.  Bank vulnerability to sudden capital outflows triggered by a
run on the currency and bank exposure to foreign exchange risk are measured by the rate of
exchange rate depreciation  and by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.  Lagged  credit
growth is also a control since high rates of credit expansion may finance an asset price bubble
that may cause a crisis when it bursts. We also include Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache's  index
7of moral hazard caused by deposit insurance  since they find that it contributes significantly to
financial fragility.5 Finally, GDP per capita is used to control for the level of development of the
country, which can proxy for the quality of regulations and the general institutional environment.
Thus, we leave GDP per capita out of the benchmark when we explore the impact of specific
banking regulations or institutional variables.
Simple correlations in Table 2 suggest that banking crises are more likely in countries
with higher levels of inflation and exchange rate depreciation, and less likely in growing
countries with higher GDP per capita.
In addition to bank concentration,  we augment the benchmark specification in Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache by using measures of bank regulation and supervision, bank ownership,
measures of the competitiveness of the banking system and the economy in general, and a
summary institutional index.  Measures of bank regulation and supervision come from Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2001).  The data set is collected through surveys of government officials and
is only cross-sectional and refers to the late 1990s, but according to Barth, Caprio and Levine,
these aspects of bank regulation have not seen much change in the last twenty years.
We use four measures of bank regulation and supervision.
Fraction  of  Entry Denied  is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the
number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities. This is a measure of entry
restrictions in banking and thus the contestability of the market.  To the extent restricted entry
increases  bank profits, this variable would be associated with a lower rate of fragility.  If
5 To build an aggregate index of moral hazard Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache (2003) use principal component
analysis of deposit insurance  design features.  Specifically, they use coinsurance,  coverage of foreign currency and
interbank deposits, type of funding, source of funding, management,  membership,  and the level of explicit coverage
to create this index, which increases in moral hazard.  The index varies over time since different countries adopted
deposit insurance or revised its design features at different points in time.
8however,  restricted entry breeds inefficiency in the banking market, it could also lead to greater
fragility.
Activity Restrictions is an indicator of restrictions on banks'  ability to engage in
securities, insurance and real estate business and takes on higher values for higher restrictions. If
these restrictions manage to keep banks from entering lines of business that are too risky for
them to adequately evaluate or manage, banking systems with greater restrictions may be more
stable.  If however, restrictions prevent firms from diversifying outside their traditional lines of
business, they may increase the fragility of the system.
Required  Reserves is the ratio of bank assets required to be held as reserves.  Banking
systems with higher ratios of required reserves may be more stable since they would have  a
greater buffer to absorb liquidity shocks.  However, high required reserves are also a tax on the
banking system leading to lower rates of profits, therefore making them more fragile.
Capital  Regulatory Index is a summary measure of capital stringency, and it is given by
the sum of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements.  To the extent book capital
is an accurate measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile.
Table 2 indicates that fraction of entry denied, activity restrictions, and required reserves
are positively and significantly correlated with each other.  Capital regulatory index is also
positively correlated  with required reserves but negatively correlated with fraction of entry
denied.  The moral hazard index is negatively and significantly correlated with all regulatory
variables except capital regulatory index where the correlation is positive.  It is also interesting
that deposit insurance schemes in concentrated banking systems tend to be designed such that
moral hazard  is significantly lower. Among the regulatory variables only activity restrictions is
significantly correlated -albeit at ten percent - with the crisis dummy, and the sign is positive.
9We also control for ownership.  If public banks are considered to have government
guarantees, banking systems with a larger share of public banks may be less prone to banking
runs.  However,  inefficiencies in public banks may also make them more fragile, destabilizing
the system.  Indeed, Caprio  and Martinez-Peria (2000) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)  find
evidence supporting the former argument.
The extent of foreign bank ownership is another important control.  To the extent foreign
banks improve domestic banks' efficiency  (as found in Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,
2001), they may also make the system more stable.  However, reduction  in profits due to higher
competition from foreign banks may also hurt the domestic banks making the system more
fragile.  Demirguc-Kunt,  Levine and Min (1998)  find that a larger foreign bank share is
associaled with a lower probability of systemic crisis.
State Ownership and Foreign  Ownership are from Barth, Caprio  and Levine (2001),
defined as the percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50 percent or more
govermnent or foreign owned.  As in the case of regulatory variables,  the assumption is that
ownership of banks does not vary significantly over the years.6 Simple correlations in Table 2
do not reveal significant relationships  between bank ownership variables and crisis occurrence.
We also use three additional variables to capture the extent of  banking freedoms and
general  economic freedoms and institutional environment.
Banking Freedom is an indicator of relative openness of the banking system.
Specifically, it is a composite index of whether foreign banks and financial services firms are
able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services
6 We also use state bank data from La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (LLS, 2002) who report figures on the
percentage of assets of the largest  10 banks owned by the government.  For each country there are two data points,
one for  1995, and one referring to public ownership "before the privatizations  of the  1990s."  In the regression,  we
use the latter figures  for the 1980s and the forrner for the  1990s.
10firms, how heavily regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether
the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers
with insurance and invest in securities.  Higher values indicate fewer restrictions  on banking
freedoms.
Economic Freedom is an indicator of how a country's policies rank in terms of providing
economic freedoms.  It is a composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade,
government finances,  government interventions, monetary policy, capital  flows and foreign
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market
activity. Higher scores indicate polices more conducive to competition and economic freedom.
Both variables are available from the Heritage Foundation and are average values for the  1995-
97 period.  To the extent freedoms allow banks to improve efficiency and to engage in different
activities and diversify their risks, we expect increased level of freedoms to reduce fragility.
However,  it is also true that greater freedoms allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly
if the underlying institutional environment  and existing regulations and supervision distort risk-
taking incentives.  Thus, overall greater freedoms may also lead to greater bank fragility.
KKZ_Composite is an index of the overall level of institutional development constructed
by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  The underlying indicators are voice and
accountability,  government effectiveness,  political stability, regulatory quality,  rule of law, and
control of corruption.  This index is available for 1998.  We expect better institutions to lead to
reduced bank fragility, controlling for all other factors.  Simple correlations indicate that the
crisis dummy is negatively and significantly correlated with the two freedom indicators and the
institutions variable.  Countries with better institutions also tend to have more competitive
banking systems with fewer regulatory restrictions.
11HII.  Methodology
In estimating the crisis model, we follow Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2003)
and use a logit probability model.  Using this model of banking crisis, we can test the hypothesis
that bank concentration and competition has an impact on fragility when other factors are
controlled for.  Thus, we estimate the probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a particular
time in a particular country, assuming that this probability is a function of our explanatory
variables -X(i,t)- discussed above. Let P(i, t) denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one
when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t and a value of zero otherwise. j is a vector
of n unknown coefficients  and F(P3rX(i, t)) is the cumulative probability distribution function
evaluated at PIVX(i, t). Then, the log-likelihood function of the model is:
Ln L =  4  tPl .T  4  j=l .{P(i,t)ln[F(P<&X(i,t))]  + (l-P(i,t)) ln[l- F(PfOX(i,t))]}.
In modeling the probability distribution we use the logistic functional form, which is
commonly  used in studying banking difficulties.7 We estimate the model with robust standard
errors since there may be heteroskedasticity across different observations.  Observations within
each country group may also be correlated.  We also deal with this problem below, by relaxing
the assumption that errors are independent within country observations.
When interpreting the regression results, it is important to remember that the estimated
coefficients do not indicate an increase in the probability of a crisis given a one-unit increase in
the corresponding  explanatory variables.  Instead,  the coefficients reflect the effect of a change in
an explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(l-P(i,t)).  Therefore, the increase in probability depends on
the original probability and thus upon the initial values of all the independent variables  and their
coefficients.  While the sign of the coefficient does indicate the direction of the change, the
12magnitude depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at  P'X(i,t).  In other
words, a change in the explanatory variable will have different effects on the probability of a
crisis depending on the country's initial crisis probability.  Under the logistic specification, if a
country has an extremely high (or low) initial probability of crisis, a marginal change  in the
independent variables has little effect on its prospects,  while the same marginal change has a
greater effect if the country's probability of crisis is in an intermediate range.
In the analysis presented below, we investigate  the impact of bank concentration variable
and different regulatory, competition,  ownership and institutional variables on bank fragility one
at a time. We also analyze if the impact of concentration  is robust to controlling for regulatory
variables  and indicators of competition and institutional development and whether there are
significant interactions with concentration  and these variables.  Finally, we explore the potential
non-linearity of the crisis-concentration relationship,  and discuss the robustness of our results to
different definitions of concentration and reverse causality.
IV.  Resuits
A.  Main findings
1. Concentration  and crises
The concentration variable enters the regressions negatively and significantly, suggesting
that concentrated  banking systems are less vulnerable to banking crises (Table 3).  Evaluating the
marginal impact of concentration on the probability of crisis at the mean values  for all variables,
we see that a one standard deviation increase  in concentration leads to a decrease in crisis
probability of one percent.  Since crisis probabilities at any point in time are quite low, with a
' In addition to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache  (1998,1999, 2003) also  see Cole and Gunther (1993), Gonzalez-
Hermosillo et al. (1997), and Demirguc-Kunt (1989).
13mean value of four percent, this is a substantial reduction.  This result is supportive of the
concenlration-stability view, i.e., that concentration  fosters a more stable banking system.
Among the control variables,  GDP growth and per capita GDP enter negatively, while the
real interest rates enter positively, as suggested by economic theory and earlier empirical  studies.
Credit growth is positive, but significant at only ten percent level, which lends weak support to
the argument that credit booms signal future fragility.  Confirming the results of Demirguc-Kunt
and DetTagiache  (2003), moral hazard enters positive and significantly, indicating that deposit
insurance design can have an important impact on fragility, and the result is weaker controlling
for bank concentration.  The model also fits the data well, classifying 65 percent of all
observations and over 70 percent of crisis observations accurately.8
In column  (3) we also add a squared concentration variable to the specification to check
for potential nonlinearities in the relationship between concentration and banking crises.  When
including the squared term, the concentration variable retains a negative and significant
coefficient at ten percent, while the squared concentration term is positive and insignificant.
Testing for the joint significance of the two variables,  we see that together the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at the five percent level.  This indicates that, although weak, at
very high levels of concentration,  there is an offsetting effect at work where concentrated
banking systems are no longer as stable.  Below, we try to understand the nature of this
nonlinearity better.  Finally, the table shows that the concentration result is not sensitive to
excluding GDP per capita from the regression.
142.  Concentration, regulations, and  crises
In Table 4, we include indicators of bank regulation to the specification.  These
specifications exclude  GDP per capita since it is also a proxy for the institutional environment.
We have also estimated specifications  where we have left out the concentration variable and
included only the regulation  supervision variables one at a time.  The results on these variables
are virtually unchanged, thus we do not report them for brevity.
The results indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory restrictions
on bank activities boost bank fragility (Table 4). A higher fraction of entry applications denied- a
proxy for tighter entry regulations - leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking system.
This is consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the efficiency of the banking
system, also making it more vulnerable to external shocks.  Similarly, we find that restrictions on
bank activities increase crisis probabilities.  This result indicates that overall these restrictions
prevent banks from diversifying outside their traditional  business, reducing their ability to limit
the riskiness of their portfolios.  The required reserves and capital regulatory index do not enter
with significant coefficients.
The results also indicate that the concentration result is robust to inclusion of regulatory
variables.  The overall effect of bank concentration  on crisis likelihood is still negative  and
significant.  In unreported regressions we have also explored specifications  where we have
interacted the concentration variable with these regulatory variables, but the interaction terms did
not enter significantly.
8  In  classifying observations, predicted probabilities significantly higher than 4 percent (no of crisis observations
divided by total number of  observations  which equals the sample mean of  the crisis dummy) are classified as crisis
153. Concentration, ownership, institutions, and  crises
In Table 5, we explore the impact of concentration,  bank ownership,  and the overall
institutional environment variables on bank fragility.  We examined each of the ownership and
institutional indicators both with and without concentration included  in the regression.  Since the
coefficients  on the ownership and institutional variables are not significantly  different in either
specification,  we only report the results of the regressions that include concentration.  The first
two columns explore the impact of bank ownership on fragility.  While we see a positive impact
of state ownership on bank fragility, this result is not very robust.9 The impact of foreign
ownership on fragility is negative, but insignificant.
The variables that capture the general openness and competitiveness of the banking
system and the economy,  and the composite institutional variable enter with negative and very
significant coefficients.10 Thus countries with greater freedoms in banking and generally more
competitive  economic policies are less likely to experience  banking crises.  This is the case
despite the fact that these policies also tend to reduce entry barriers and are correlated with
reduced levels of bank concentration.  Better institutional environment is also associated with a
lower probability of systemic crisis, as expected.  The evidence is consistent with theories that
emphasize the stabilizing effects of competition (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2003), but inconsistent
with the many models that stress the destabilizing effects from competition.'
observations  and those below 4 percent are classified  as no crisis.
9  In the specification that excludes bank concentration,  state ownership  is  not significant.  Replicating these
regressions using LLS (2002)  measure of state bank ownership confirm  these findings.
10 In  the specification without bank concentration,  the economic freedom variable is  significant at only ten percent.
" Boyd and De Nicolo (2003)  stress that competition exerts a stabilizing impact on banks because more competitive
banks charge lower interest rates to firms and these lower rates reduce the likelihood of default.  This prediction is
consistent with our results.  However, Boyd and De Nicolo  (2003) use bank concentration  as an indicator of bank
competition.  Thus, they stress that concentration  will exert a destabilizing  impact on banks, which is  inconsistent
with our results.
16The results on bank concentration are robust to including bank ownership and general
competition and institutional variables.  In unreported regressions we also explored whether the
impact of concentration on fragility differs in countries with different levels of freedoms and
institutional development,  by including interaction terms in the regressions.  None of these
interaction terms were significant, suggesting that bank concentration reduces fragility regardless
of the competition environment or the institutional development of the country.
4. Concentration, regulations, ownership, institutions, and crises
In Table 6, we simultaneously include bank concentration,  regulations, ownership,  and
institutions.  In each specification we enter bank concentration,  the index of overall institutional
development, and a measure of regulation.  Bank concentration remains significantly, negatively
associated with bank fragility even when controlling for the regulatory variables  and overall
institutional development.  Indeed, the size of the coefficient on concentration is not substantially
affected by expanding the conditioning information set.  In contrast, the regulatory restriction
variables and the overall institutional development indicators exhibit substantial
multicollinearity.  Their independent significance is materially weakened in Table 6 when they
are included jointly.  These results suggest that regulatory approaches to banking are part of the
overall institutional approach to openness, competition,  and private property in the economy.
Thus, while regulations and institutions matter for bank fragility,  they do not
independently explain banking crises.  Bank concentration  is different.  The evidence in Table 6
suggests that bank concentration is not a simple proxy for regulatory  restrictions or national
institutions.  Bank concentration  enters negatively in the crisis regression when controlling for
regulations and institutions.  This constitutes strong evidence  for arguments that more
17concentrated  banking systems are more stable and is inconsistent with theories that predict more
fragility in more concentrated  banking systems.
The findings that (i) concentration  lowers fragility and (ii) low competition raises
fragility imply that we need to move beyond a simple "concentration-stability"  versus
"concentration-fragility"  debate where concentration is viewed as a simple proxy for market
power.  If our measures of regulatory  restrictions and market openness do a reasonably good job
of measuring the competitiveness of the banking industry, then the finding that concentration
remains negatively associated with the probability of suffering a systemic banking crises, implies
that concentration  is measuring "something else" besides market power.  As discussed in Allen
and Gale (2000, 2003),  concentrated banking systems may promote greater diversification and it
may be easier to monitor a few large banks than many smaller banks.  At the same time, the
results suggest that competition and contestability promote  stability.  This is inconsistent with
franchise  value arguments, but consistent with theories that emphasize the benefits of operating
in a competitive industry and a sound institutional environment  (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2003).
5.  Why does concentration  matter?
Next, we investigate if the results on concentration  are due to the ability of banks in
concentrated banking systems to better diversify, or the ease with which regulators and market
participants  monitor the riskiness of fewer banks.  The argument that banks in more concentrated
systems diversify better assumes concentrated  banking systems have larger banks.  Thus, in
Table 7, we add to our baseline specification a mean bank size variable defined as the total bank
assets divided by the number of banks. 12  As an alternative indicator of bank diversification,  we
use a diversification index from Barth et al.  (2001) database, which asks whether regulators have
diversification  guidelines  and whether banks are prohibited  from investing abroad.
18Another potential determiinant of whether banks can diversify their portfolios effectively
is the size of the economy.  To investigate if banks are able to better diversify in larger
economies, we include level of GDP in the specification.13 Finally, to see if the number of banks
makes a difference in monitoring risks and therefore preventing crises, we also include this
variable.  As the results in Table 7 show, none of these additional variables develop significant
coefficients in the regressions, while the concentration coefficient remains negative and
significant.  However,  the significance level is lower at ten percent when we control for mean
bank size and the size of the economy, suggesting that diversification explanation may have
some merit.
B.  Sensitivity analyses
In Table 8, we try to better understand  how the relationship between concentration and
fragility changes at high levels of bank concentration.  In columns (1) to (6) we define a high
concentration dummy for different cut-off levels of concentration using 45th to 70th percentiles,
where the dummy takes the value one at this cut-off value of concentration  or higher. Results
indicate that the high concentration dummy is significant between the 50t'  and 70h percentiles,
for concentration levels of 77 percent or higher.  However, once we hit the 70'  percentile, at
concentrations levels of 87 percent or higher, the effect is no longer significant.  The loss of
significance may be due to the fact we only have  11 countries with concentration levels of over
87 percent that experienced a crisis, and when the sample becomes very imbalanced with respect
to crisis/non-crisis  observations estimation becomes imprecise.  In the last column, we estimate a
polynomial, including squared and cubed concentration terms.  This does not yield significant
results either.  To see if in addition to the intercept change there is also a slope change at high
12 Using the mean bank size of the largest three banks does not change our results.
'3 Replacing GDP by M2 to control for the size of the financial system does not change our results significantly.
19concentration  levels, we also explored specifications where we included an interaction term of
the concentration variable and high concentration  dummy.  The coefficient estimate was not
significant.
We conclude that while there is some evidence that the impact of concentration  on
stability is less strong at high levels of concentration,  this result is somewhat sensitive to how we
define high concentration.  In sum, our results indicate  that the overall effect of concentration on
fragility is negative at all levels of bank concentration, even after we control for bank regulation
and supervision,  differences  in bank ownership, the level of competitiveness  in banking and the
economy and general institutional development.
In Table 9, we investigate  the sensitivity of our results to the way we define the
concentration  variable.  We first replicate the regression replacing the concentration variable by
the one obtained from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001).  This measure of concentration,  obtained
through surveys of bank regulators, is calculated  as the fraction of deposits held by the five
largest commercial  banks in each country as of end-1999.  We expect this measure not to suffer
from problems of differential coverage in each country since the source is the bank regulators
themselves.  Using this different measure of bank concentration,  we get very similar results.
There may exist concerns regarding reverse causality.  This would be the case if systemic
crises led to lower levels of concentration in the banking system through greater entry or changes
in general competition policies.  When we inspect individual crisis cases in our sample, however,
we do not see a significant pattern of reduced concentration  after the crisis episodes and the
concentration  levels do not vary significantly from year to year. 14  Nevertheless,  we estimate a
specification where we define concentration as the initial level of concentration (1988 or the first
available year) instead of the 1988-97 average.  As can be seen in column 3 of Table 9, this does
20not change  our results significantly,  consistent with the observation that concentration does not
vary much over time.  This estimation is still subject to problems though, since some of the crisis
episodes have taken place before the date for which we have data for concentration.  Thus, we
drop all those crisis episodes, which precede the initial concentration date.  This leaves us with
only 20 crisis episodes and less than half of the total number of observations, yet the
concentration variable still remains negative and significant (column 4, Table 9).  These results
lead us to believe that the negative impact of concentration on banking system fragility is not due
to reverse causality.
So far in the analysis, we have allowed for heteroskedasticity  of errors and corrected for
it, but assumed that the errors are independent.  However,  given that we use a panel data set, it is
likely that the error terms within individual country observations are correlated with each other.
Table  10, column 1 reports our results relaxing the assumption that within country observations
are independent.  Concentration still enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  In
column 2, we estimate a logit model with random country effects.  Again, the results are not
significantly different.
We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to using alternative samples. In column 3
we exclude from the sample all countries with populations of less than 1 million.  Results are not
sensitive to excluding small countries.  In column 4, we exclude all African countries since they
tend to have very high bank concentration ratios. We see that our results are not driven by
African observations.  In column 5, we exclude all developed countries from the analysis.
Again, we see that concentration significantly reduces fragility also in the sample of developing
4 Also note that the actual crisis period immediately following the crisis is taken out of the estimations.
21countries.  Finally, in column 6 we exclude  a few outlier observations in terms of inflation and
interest rates, which leaves the results unchanged.' 5
V.  Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration,  bank regulations, bank
ownership, and the overall competitive/institutional environment on banking system fragility.
We use cross-country  data on 79 countries and 50 crisis episodes.  In concluding, we emphasize
the following findings.
First, bank concentration has a stabilizing effect.  Concentrated banking systems are less
likely to experience  systemic banking crises, even after controlling for a wide array of
macroeconomic,  regulatory and institutional factors.  There is also some evidence that the
stabilizing effect of bank concentration is weaker at higher levels of concentration, although this
does not change the fact that the overall impact of concentration on fragility is negative and that
the relationship holds regardless of the quality of bank regulations or the overall
competitive/institutional  climate.
Second, entry barriers and activity restrictions have a destabilizing effect on banking
systems.  Banking systems where a larger fraction of entry applications are denied, and those
with tighter activity restrictions that limit expansion into different lines of business suffer a
greater likelihood of systemic crisis.  The data do not support the view that more competition
induces greater fragility.  Quite to the contrary, more competitive banking systems and those
with fewer entry regulations and activity restrictions tend to be more stable.
Finally, we find that countries with better-developed  institutions and with policies that
promote competition throughout the economy are less likely to suffer from systemic banking
1 5Excluded observations are Gabon  (1993) and Cote d'lvoire (1993)  because their M2/reserves  values are outliers
22crises.  The composite indicator of institutional development always has a negative and
significant sign in the fragility regressions.  Moreover, we find that it is difficult to identify the
independent effect of bank regulations and bank policies that promote competition from the
overall institutional environment.  Countries with better institutions (property rights, rule of law,
political openness,  low corruption, etc.)  also tend to be countries with bank regulations and bank
policies that support openness and competition.  Thus, while bank regulations and policies that
foster competition and contestability promote bank stability, these regulations and policies
cannot be viewed in isolation from the overall institutional environment.
In sum, we find that (1) concentration lowers fragility and (2) low competition raises
fragility.  These results suggest that we need to complicate the simple "concentration-stability"
versus "concentration-fragility"  debate.  If our indicators of regulations,  bank policies,
ownership,  and institutions do a reasonably good job of measuring the competitiveness  of the
banking industry then the finding that concentration lowers fragility implies that concentration is
measuring something beyond market power.  We try to see if this "something else" is related to
diversification or benefits from monitoring only a few large banks.  Although we find weak
evidence that big banks are more diversified, future research needs to more completely explain
exactly why bank concentrations  is associated with a lower likelihood of suffering a systemic
banking crisis.
and Peru (1991) because its inflation and real interest rate values are outliers.
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26Table 1. Bank Concenintradon  and Compmetdoitn  amd Bankimg Crses
GDP per capita is in constant dollars, averaged over the entire sample period.  Crisis period denotes the years in which each
country experienced a systemic banking crisis and the duration of said crisis.  Concentration  is a measure of  concentration  in the
banking  industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample
period.  Sources are in the data appendix.
GDP per capita  Crisis Period  Concentration
Australia  17,913  0.65
Austria  25,785  0.75
Bahrain  9,398  0.93
Belgium  24,442  0.64
Belize  2,996
Benin  362  (1998-90)  1.00
Botswana  2,781  0.94
Burkina Faso  230  (1988-94)
Burundi  186  1.00
Cameroon  790  (1987-93,  1995-98)  0.95
Canada  18,252  0.58
Chile  3,048  (1981-87)  0.49
Colombia  1,802  (1982-85)  0.49
Congo  940  1.00
Cote d'lvoire  843  (1988-91)  0.96
Cyprus  9,267  0.88
Denmark  31,049  0.78
Dominican Republic  1,426  0.65
Ecuador  1,516  (1995-97)  0.40
Egypt  905  0.67
El Salvador  1,450  (1989)  0.84
Finland  23,304  (1991-94)  0.85
France  24,227  0.44
Gabon  4,625
Gambia  369
Germany  27,883  0.48
Ghana  356  (1982-89)  0.89
Greece  10,202  0.79
Guatemala  1,415  0.37
Guinea  523  (1993-94)
Guyana  653  (1993-95)  1.00
Honduras  694  0.44
India  313  (1991-97)  0.47
Indonesia  761  (1992-97)  0.44GDP per capita  Crisis Period  Concentration
Ireland  13,419  0 74
Israel  13,355  (1983-84)  0.84
Italy  17,041  (1990-95)  0.35
Jamaica  1,539  (1996-97)  0.82
Japan  35,608  (1992-97)  0.24
Jordan  1,646  (1989-90)  0 92
Kenya  336  (1993)  0.74
Korea  6,857  (1997)  0 31
Lesotho  356  1.00
Malawi  154
Malaysia  3,197  (1985-88,  1997)  0.54
Mali  260  (1987-89)  0 91
Mauritania  456  (1984-93)
Mauritius  2,724  0 94
Mexico  3,240  (1982,  1994-97)  0 63
Nepal  179  (1988-97)  0 90
Netherlands  22,976  0 76
New Zealand  15,539  0 77
Niger  245  (1983-97)
Nigeria  251  (1991-95)  0.83
Norvay  28,843  (1987-93)  0.85
Panama  2,824  (1988-89)  0.42
Papua New Guinea  1,024  0 87
Peru  2,458  (1983-90)  0 69
Philippmes  1,070  (1981-87)  0.49
Portugal  8,904  (1986-89)  0 46
Senegal  562  (1988-91)  0.94
Seychelles  5,719
Siena Leone  260  (1990-97)  1 00
Singapore  20,079  0 71
South Africa  3,680  (1985)  0.77
Sri Lanka  588  (1989-93)  0.86
Swaziland  1,254  (1995)  0.95
Sweden  24,845  (1990-93)  0 89
Switzerland  42,658  0 77
Tanzania  170  (1988-97)  1  00
28GDP per capita  Crisis Period  Concentration
Thailand  1,886  (1983-87,  1997)  0.54
Togo  366  1.00
Tunisia  1,831  0.63
Turkey  2,451  (1982,1991,1994)  0.45
United Kingdom  16,883  0.57
United States  24,459  (1980-92)  0.19
Uruguay  5,037  (1981-85)  0.87
Venezuela  3,558  (1993-97)  0.52
Zambia  464  0 84
29Table 2.  Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary statistics are presented  in Panel A and correlations  in Panel B and C.  Banking crisis is a crisis dunmmy,  which takes on the value of one if there  is a systemic crisis and
the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation  is the
ratc of changc of thc GDP dcflator  M/.eserves  is tLhe  ratio of M2 to international reserves  Cred:t growvth  is the real growth of domestic credit,  lagged tvo periods  Depreciation
is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate  index of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration  is a measure of
concentration  in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the'three largest banks in each country, averaged over the samnple period.  Fraction of entry denied
is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities  Activity restrictions measures  the degree to
which a bank is able to engage  in business of securities underwriting,  tnsurance underwriting  and selling, and in real estate  investment, management,  and development.  Requtred
reserves is the percentage of reserves required to be held by banks.  Capital regulatory index measures capital strmgency  in the banking system.  State ownership  measures the
percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50%/o or more government owned, while foreign ownership measures percentage  of banking system's assets in banks that
are 50% or more foreign owned.  Banking freedom is indicator of the relative  openness of banking and financial system  Economic freedom is a composite measure of institutional
factors detemining economic freedom  KKZ  composite is a composite measure of govemance  indicators  Sources  are given in the data appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics:
Mean  Median  St Dev  Maximum  Minimum  Observations
Banking crisis  0.04  0 00  0.20  1.00  0 00  1238
Growth  3 41  3.45  4.25  23.60  -17  15  1216
Termsoftradechange  0.15  0.01  10.30  63.24  -51.45  1191
Real interest rate  1.58  2.68  19.34  151.21  '  -283.00  1160
Inflation  14.07  7 75  23 42  350 56  -29.17  1220
M2/reserves  1987  6.56  68.86  128931  0 19  1222
Depreciation  0.10  0.04  0 22  2.62  -0.35  1238
Credit Growth, 2 6.01  5.09  15.84  115.42  -54 62  1203
Real GDP per capita  7,813.94  2,302 37  10,299.92  45,950.46  134 54  1222
Moral hazard  -1 09  -2.49  2.24  3.98  -2.49  1238
Concentration  0.72  0.77  0.21  1.00  0 19  1106
Fraction of entry denied  0.21  0 08  0.29  1.00  0.00  688
Activity restrictions  9 44  9.00  2.64  14.00  4.00  903
Required reserves  12 48  10.00  11.86  43 00  0 00  692
Capital regulatory  index  5 41  5.50  1.70  8 00  2 00  871
State ownership  17.84  11.56  20.95  80.00  000  796
Foreign ownership  23  85  11.70  26 59  99.00  0.00  710
Banking freedom  3.36  3.00  0 88  5.00  1.00  1184
Economic freedom  3.17  3.05  0.61  4.50  1.9  1184
KKZ  composite  0.28  -0.03  0.79  1.72  -1.03  1220Panel B: Correlationns:  Banking Crisis, Concentration, Regulations, and Institutions
Banking crisis  Concentration  Fraction of  Activity  Required  Capital  Moral  State  Foreign  Banking  Economic entry denied  restrictions  reserves  Regulatory  hazard  ownership  ownership  freedom  freedom
index Banking crisis
Concentration  -0.037
Fraction of entry  0.058  0.001
denied
Activity  0.058*  -0.027  0.461°44
restrictions
Required  reserves  0.016  0.183"4'  0.334"'*  0.23344°
Capital regulatory  -0.016  0.053  -0.048  -0.084444  0.229**' index
Moral  hazard  0.016  -0.396"*'  -0.238"4'  -0.24844  -0.105444  0.10744
State ownership  0.034  0.048  0.43344°  0.284444  0.356444  0.039  -0.022
Foreign ownership  -0.050  0.394444  0.059  0.025  0.262**'  0.192444  -0.321444  -0.234444
Banling freedom  -0.06344  -0.0249**  -0.382444  -0.4774**  -0.101444  0.077444  0.174444  -0.385444  0.190444
Economic freedom  -0.0534  -0.390"*  -0.450**'  -0.515444  -0.401***  0.06944  0.327**'  -0.539444  -0.003  0.745444
KKZ_composite  -0.066"'*  0.35444  o0.507444  -0.566444  0.4450**  0.06744  0.3544°4  -0.460444  0.029  0.560444  0.861"'*
444,44, and 4 indicate statistical  significance at 1,  5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Pamnel C: CorreRadons:  Banking Crisis, Concentration, and Macro Indicators
Banking  crisis  Real GDP  Terms of trade  Real interest  Inflation  M2/reserves  Depreciation  Credit Growtht2 Real GDP per growth  change  rate  capita Banking crisis
Real  GDP growth  -0.134444
Terms of trade  change  -0.014  0.0464
Real interest rate  0.003  0.085**'  -0.050*
Intlation  0.067**4  -0.103444  0.038  -0,98044
M2/reserves  0.034  -0.098"'*  0 007  0 010  -0 015 Depreciation  0.074444  -0.168444  -0.020  -0.546"'*  0 616"4  -0 031 Credit growth,2 0.044  0.024  0.000  0.003  -0.007  -0.0454  -0.05444 Real GDP per capita  -0.05744  -0.05544  0 017  0.026  -0.0474  -0.033  -0.201"'*  -0.008 Concentration  -0.037  -0.076"44  -0.007  0.004  0.000  0.100444  0.0444  -0.001  -0.246444
444,44, and 4 indicate statistical significance  at 1,  5, and 10 percent, respectively.Table 3.  Banking Crisis and Concentration
The logit probability model estimated  is Bankng Crisis [Com  T,,T,.,,t]=  a + pi3  Real GDP growth,t+ 02 Terms of trade change,, + P33  Real interest rate,,+  034 Infation,.,
P5M2/reserves,t +  1) 6 Depreciation,t  +  037 Credit growth,.1.2 + P
3
s  Real GDP per capitat,+09 Moral Hazard Index,,+0310 Average concentration,1+ p l l Concentration  2,,+ 6,,. The
dependent vanable  is a crisis  dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real
interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to
international  reserves.  Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit,  lagged two penods.  Depreciation  is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an
aggregate index of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance  schemes.  Concentration  is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets
held by the three largest banks in each country,  averaged over the samnple period.  Bank data are from the BankScope  database of Fitch IBCA.  The sample period  is 1980-1997.
White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given  in parentheses.  Detailed vanable  definitions and sources are given  in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Real GDP growth  -0  142***  -0.166***  -0.162***  -0.163***
(0.031)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.036)
Tenns of trade change  -0.007  -0.011  -0.010  -0.012
(0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)
Real interest rate  0.009***  0.010***  0.011 ***  0 010*o*
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Inflation  0.008  0 009  0.010  0.009
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0 008)
M2/reserves  0.001  0.002*  0.002*  0.002*
(0.001)  (0.001)  (O 001)  (0.001)
Depreciation  0.692  0.448  0.503  0 821
(1.067)  (I  202)  (1.217)  (1.176)
Credit Growtht.2 0.013*  0.014*  0.015*  0.016*
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0 009)  (0.010)
Real GDP per capita  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.005**
(0.002)  (0 002)  (0.002)
Moral Hazard  Index  0.157***  0.103  0.120*  0.042
(0 071)  (0.075)  (0 081)  (0.076)
Concentration  -1.749**  -7.447*  -1.567**
(0.871)  (4.711)  (0.862)
(Concentration) 2 4.346
(3.602)
No. of Crisis  50  46  46  46
No  of Observations  1111  997  997  997
% cnsis correct  70  70  72  70
% correct  65  65  64  62
Model x2 4730***  47.29***  53 46***  36.77***
* *,**,  and *  indicate  statistical significance at 1,  5, and 10 percent,  respectively.Tab1le 4.  Banking Crisis, Regulatfion and Concenitrafion
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [cO,,.  Timestt=  a + PI Real GDP growtht+ 02 Terms of trade change,,, + ,B3 Real interest rater,t +  14 Inflation j,, +
,B5M2/reserves;p  + 06Depreciation  p  +  01  Credit growth1 3
t-2+ j 8Moral Hazard Indexj,&+0 9 Concentration,,4+  ,13 Regulatory measures,;t+  c;,,. The dependent variable is a crisis
dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal
interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of  the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves  is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.  Credit
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate  index of moral hazard
associated with deposit insurance  schemes.  Concentration is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated  as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks
in each  country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of  Fitch  IBCA. The sample period  is 1980-1997.  The Regulatory measures in
specifications  (1)-(4) - Fraction of entry denied, Activity restrictions,  Required reserves  and Capital regulatory  index, - are included one at a time. Fraction of entry denied
measures the number of entry  applications denied as a fraction of the total received.  Activity restrictions captures bank's ability to engage in business of securities underwriting,
insurance underwriting  and selling, and in real estate investment,  management, and development.  Required reserves  are ratio of  reserves required to be held by banks.  Capital
regulatory index is a summary measure of capital  stringency.  White's  heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.  Detailed variable definitions and
sources are given  in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Concentration  - -2.320*  -1.928**  -2.695***  -2.375***
(1.554)  (1.016)  (1.203)  (1.115)
Fraction of Entry Denied  1.993***
(0.750)
Activity Restrictions  0.182***
(0.073)
Required Reserves  0.017
(0.017)
Capital Regulatory Index  -0.078
(0.129)
No. of  Crisis  21  34  27  33
No. of Observations  583  767  572  755
% crisis correct  67  74  67  70
% correct  77  75  72  73
Model x2 31.97***  37.38***  30.38t**  37.38***
§ub§  and  b indicate statistical  significance  at 1, 5, and  10 percent,  respectively.
33Table 5.  Banking Crisis, Ownership, Institutions, and Concentration
The logit probability model estimated  is Banking Crisis IcOun,Y=J  T.,= t= a + 1  Real GDP growtht+ 02 Terms of trade changet,  + 03 Real interest ratep,, + 04 Inflation,, +
05M2/reserves1,, + 03 6Depreciation1 r  + 07 Credit growth,1 ,. 2 +138 Moral hazard  indexN,,  + 19 Concentrationj,,  + 1 1o  Regulatory measures 1,,+  t,t. The dependent variable  is a crisis
dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP  Real interest rate is the nominal
interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves  is the ratio of M2 to international reserves  Credit
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged  two periods.  Depreciation  is the rate of change of the exchange  rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate  index of moral hazard
associated with deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated  as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks
in each country,  averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample penod is 1980-1997  The Regulatory measures  in
specifications (l)-(5) - State ownership, Foreign ownership,  Banking freedom, Economic freedom, and KKZ  composite - are included one at a time.  State ownership is the
percentage  of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned. Foreign ownership is the percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or
more foreign owned.  Banking freedom is an indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system,  while economic freedom is a composite of 10 institutional factors
determining economic freedom.  KKZ_composite  is an aggregate  measure of six governance  indicators.  White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in
parentheses.  Detailed variable definitions  and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Concentration  -2.571***  -2  199**  -I 828**  -1.840***  -1.738**
(1.132)  (1.089)  (0.861)  (0.857)  (0.828)
State ownership  0 015t
(0.008)
Foreign ownership  -0.003
(0.008)
Banking Freedom  -0.451***
(0.160)




No. of Crisis  32  31  46  46  46
No. of obs.  686  609  963  963  997
% crisis correct  75  71  72  72  74
% correct  69  66  62  61  65
Model x 2 30.90***  33.66***  50.57***  44.99***  47.22***
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
34Table 6.  Bankdng  Crisis, Governance, Ownership, lInstitutions, and Concentration
The logit probability model  estimated is Banking Crisis [country=,  T,me  t]= a + L ' Real GDP growth 1 ,t+ 02 Terms of trade change 1,, + 03 Real interest ratei,, + P4 Inflation j,, +
05M2/reserves1 t + 06Depreciation,,t  + 07 Credit growth, .2+1s  Moral  hazard index,,, +139  KKZ_composite1, + 0  10 Concentration 1 t+,t  13  ,, Regulatory measures;,t+  &s,t. The dependent
variable  is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest
rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to intemational
reserves.  Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation  is the rate of change of the exchange rate  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of
moral hazard associated with deposit insurance  schemes.  KKZ_composite is an aggregate  measure of six govemance indicators.  Concentration is a measure of concentration  in the
banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database
of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is  1980-1997.  The Regulatory  measures  in specifications (2)-(4) - Fraction of entry denied, Activity restrictions, and State ownership - are
included one at a time. Fraction of entry denied measures the number of entry applications  denied as a fraction of the total received.  Activity restrictions captures  bank's ability to
engage in business of securities underwriting,  insurance  underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management,  and development.  State ownership  is the percentage
of baning system's assets in banks that are 50% or more govemment owned.  White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Concentration  -1.738**  -2.324*  -1.96244  -2.515t**
(0.828)  (1.588)  (0.992)  (1.141)
KKZ_composite  -0.460*4t  0.018  -0.138  -0.319
(0.206)  (0.517)  (0.329)  (0.313)
Fraction of Entry  2.016*
Denied  (1.182)
Activity Restrictions  0.162*
(0.992)
State ownership  0.011
(0.009)
No. of Crisis  46  21  34  32
No. of obs.  997  583  767  686
% crisis correct  74  67  74  75
% correct  65  77  74  70
Model x2 47.22***  43.78***  46.01**  40.04***
*,*¶*,  and * indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
35Table 7.  Banking Crisis and Concentration: Diversification  vs. Ease of Supervision
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis pu  , j=  r  a +  3  1  Real GDP growth,,,+ 12 Terms of trade change,,, + 03 Real interest rate 1,,  + 04 Inflation ,t+
13 5M2/reservesi,,+  13 6Depreciation3,  + 17 Credit growthJ t.2+  Moral  hazard index 3.,+  OConcentration 3 ,t+ 
10 3 Mean Bank Size,,+Pl I Diversification,t+  012 GDP,t + 013  No. of
Banksj + cs  ,. The dependent variable  is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth
of real GDP.  Real  interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio
of M2 to international  reserves.  Credit growth is the real growth of domestic  credit; lagged two periods.  Depreciatton is the rate of change of the exchange rate  Moral  hazard is
an aggregate mdex of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance schemes. Concentration  is a measure of concentration in the banking industry,  calculated as the fraction  of
assets held by the three largest banks in each  country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA  The sample period is 1980-
1997.  Mean Bank Size is given by average bank asset size (in billions of US dollars).  Diversification  is an indicator of whether there are guidelines regarding asset diversification.
GDP is real GDP in billions of US$.  No. of banks is given in hundreds and is from Barth et al database.  White's heteroskedasiticy  consistent standard errors are given in
parentheses.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Concentration  -1.576*  -2.349**  -1.479*  -2.234**  -2.019*
(0.899)  (1.083)  (0.879)  (I  162)  (1.162)
Mean Bank  Size  0.000  -0.001
(0.001)  (0.002)
Diversification  -0.207  -0  184
(0.346)  (0.363)
GDP ($)  0.003  0.001
(0.002)  (0 001)
No  of banks  0.008  -0.000
(0 014)  (0.001)
No. of Crisis  46  34  46  34  34
No. of obs.  979  767  997  767  767
% crisis  correct  74  71  72  68  76
% correct  63  74  64  73  75
Model X2 48.36***  47.04***  47.67***  43.90**  56.05***
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
36Table 8.  Banking Crisis and High Concemtration: Robustness
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis JC,,  Tut,  I=  a +  Real GDP growth,,+  02  Terms of trade change,,, + 03  Real interest rate,,+  04 lnflation ,,+
05M2/reservesj,,  + j16Depreciationi,,  + 07 Credit growthN,  2 + 3 8 Real GDP per capita,,t+03  Moral Hazard Index1 t+p  I0 Average concentrationi&+ 3  1 High concentration, ,,  E+.  The
dependent variable is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real
interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves  is the ratio of M2 to
intemational reserves.  Credit growth is the real growth of  domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an
aggregate index of  moral hazard associated with deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of  assets
held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  High concentration  is a dummy taking a value of one in cases where the banking concentration  is
greater than or equal to the cutoff listed in the footnote of  the table.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of  Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. Specifications
(1)- (6) use high concentration at the 459,  50,  55h, 60",  65"', and 70"'  percentile, respectively.  White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Concentration  -3.428***  -4.052*4  -4.1694*4  44.357  437  -2.7264  -26.700*
(1.407)  (1.368)  (1.311)  (1.344)  (1.344)  (1.233)  (15.259)
High Concentration  0.832*  1.24644  1.362**  1.590***  1.590*44  0.773







No. of Crisis  46  46  46  46  46  46  46
No. of Observations  997  997  997  997  997  997  997
% crisis correct  76  76  76  74  74  70  76
% correct  65  66  64  65  65  64  66
Model X
2 47.244*4  50.03***  54.54*44  54.79***  54.7944e  52.17444  54.19**4
Value of cutoff  0.73927  0.76707  0.78977  0.83955  0.84154  0.87530
444,44  and 4 indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and  10 percent, respectively.
37Table 9.  Banking Crisis and Concentration:  Robustness I
The logit probability model estimated  is Banking Crisis [crn-j,,Tint,=t  a + I3  Real GDP  growth,,t+ ,B2  Terms of trade change,,  + 03 Real  interest rateC, + D4  Inflation 1,,+
05M2/reserves 1,, + 06Depreciation2,  + 07 Credit growthj,,.2+  P8 Real GDP per capita,,,+0 9Moral  Hazard lndexjl+jo  10Average  concentration,,+  E,t. The dependent variable is a crisis
dummy,  which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic  crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal
interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves  is the ratio of M2 to intemational reserves.  Credit
growth  is the real growth of domestic  credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard
associated  with deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration  is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated  as the fraction of assets  held by the three  largest banks
in each country, averaged  over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database  of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  In specification  (2) Average
Concentration is replaced  by the concentration  data from Barth,  Caprio and Levine (2001 for the entire sample period.  In specification (3)  Average Concentration  is replaced by
the Initial Concentration, for the entire sample period. In specification (4) the sample is restricted to the actual date of Initial Concentration and the years following that date (for
many of the countnes,  the restricted sample is either  1988-97 or  1990-97) White's heteroskedasiticy  consistent standard  errors are given  in parentheses.  Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Concentration  -I.749**  -1.536*  -1.678**  -3.481***
(0.871)  (1.010)  (0.869)  (1.502)
No. of Crisis  46  32  46  20
No. of Observations  997  730  997  415
% crisis correct  70  72  70  70
% correct  65  75  . 65  71
Model X
2 47 29***  47.99***  46.22***  40.68***
**,  and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent,  respectively.
38Table  10.  1Banmkimg  Cirisis and Concentratioua:  IRobustmess 1131
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis  (Country  Time= t= a +  1l  Real  GDP growth,,,+  02 Terms of trade change,,, + P3 Real interest rate,,, + ,B4 Inflation  t+
15M2/reserves,, +  ,  6Depreciation1 ,  + ,B 7 Credit growths  t.2 + 18 Real GDP per capita 1.t+19 Moral Hazard Indexj,,+I 10Average concentration,,  + E,t.The dependent variable is a crisis
dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal
interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves  is the ratio of M2 to international  reserves.  Credit
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral  hazard
associated with deposit insurance schemes. Concentration  is a measure of concentration  in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks
in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. In specification (I) the sample is
clustered by country.  In specification (2) the estimation includes random  country effects.  In specification  (3) the sample excludes all countries with populations of less than I
million.  In specification  (4) the sample excludes all African countries.  In specification  (5) the sample excludes all developed  countries.  In specification (6) we remove outliers
found in three control variables - real interest rate, inflation, and m2/reserves.  White's heteroskedasiticy  consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.  Detailed variable
definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Concentration  -4.357444  -1  .749444  -1.82944  -2.368*4  -1.60444  -1.80644
(1.033)  (0.089)  (0.917)  (1.133)  (0.852)  (0.876)
No. of Crisis  46  46  44  34  38  46
No. of Observations  997  997  935  742  670  995
% crisis correct  74  73  74  74  72
% correct  65  65  69  54  65
Model x 2 59.10444  40.28444  56.014O4  43.394°°  29.19°44  47.73***
440,44, and 4 indicate statistical significance  at 1, 5, and  10 percent, respectively.
39Data Appendix
Vanable Name  Definition  Source
Banking crisis  Dummy takes on value of one durng episodes identified  as a  Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragaiche (2003)
systematic banking crises
Growth  Rate of growth of real GDP  WDI (World Bank)
Terms of trade change  Change in the terms of trade  WDI (World Bank)
Real  interest rate  Nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous  rate of  IFS (IMF)
inflation
Inflation  Rate of change of GDP deflator  IFS (IMF)
M2/reserves  Ratio of M2 to international  reserves  IFS (IMF)
Depreciation  Rate of depreciation  IFS (IMF)
Credit growth  Rate of growth of real domestic credit to the private sector  IFS line 32d divided by GDP deflator
GDP/CAP  Real GDP per capita  WDI (World Bank)
GDP  Real GDP in billions of US dollars  WDI (World Bank)
Moral hazard index  Aggregate index of moral hazard associated with deposit  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragaiche (2003)
insurance  schemes, calculated using principal component
analysis
Concentration  Degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated  as  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,  Levine (2000) - Financial  Structures Database
the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. Averaged
over the 1988-97 period.
Mean Bank Size  Total banking assets divided by number of banks.  BankScope database.
Diversification  Diversification  index uses responses to survey questions 7.1  and  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of bank Regulation  and Supervision
7.2.  Question 7.1  asks if there are explicit, verifiable, and
quantifiable  guidelines regarding  asset diversification  (yes=l,
no=0).  Question 7.2 asks if banks are prohibited from making
loans abroad (yes=l, no=O).  The index is calculated  as Q7.1-
((Q7.2 -
No. of Banks  No. of banks m hundreds.  Barth, Caprio,  and Levine (2001) -Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision
Fraction of entry denied  Number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation  and Supervision
of applications  received from domestic and foreign entities
Activity restrictions  Indicator of bank's ability to engage in business of securities  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation  and Supervision
underwriting,  insurance underwriting and selling, and in real
estate investment, management,  and development
Required reserves  Ratio of reserves required to be held by banks  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) -Survey of Bank Regulation  and Supervision
40Variable Name  Defnition  Source
Capital regulatory index  Summary measure of capital  stringency:  sum of overall and  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001)  - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision
initial capital stringency.  Higher values indicate greater
stringency.
State ownership  Percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50%/O  or  Barth, Caprio,  and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision
more government owned
Foreign ownership  Percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or  Barth, Caprio,  and Levine (2001) -Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision
more foreign owned
Banking Freedom  Indicator of relative openness of banking and financial system:  Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage  Foundation)
specifically, whether the foreign banks and financial services
firms are able to operate freely,  how difficult it is to open
domestic banks and other financial services  firms, how heavily
regulated the financial  system is, the presence of  state-owned
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit,
and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance
and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index ranges  in
value from  I (very low - banks are primitive) to 5 (very high -
few restrictions).  Averaged over 1995-97 period
Economic Freedom  Composite of 10 institutional factors determining  economic  Index of Economic  Freedom (Heritage Foundation)
freedom: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, govemment
intervention  in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and
foreign investment, banking and finance,  wages and prices,
property rights, regulation,  and black market activity. Individual
factors are weighted equally to determine overall score of
economic freedom.  A high score signifies an institutional or
consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic
freedom,  while a score close to I signifies a set of policies that
are least conducive.  Averaged over  1995-97 period.
KKZ_composite  Composite of six govemance  indicators (1998  data): voice and  Kaufman,  Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton  (1999)
accountability,  political stability,  government effectiveness,
regulatory  quality, rule of law, and corruption.  Individual factors
are weighted equally to determine overall  score of economic
freedom.  Higher values correspond to better govemance
outcomes.
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